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Defense Daily, June 3, 2005.
37. Congressional Budget Office, Options for the Navy s Future Fleet, 15, 19.
38. John Shank et al., Modernizing the U.S. Aircraft Carrier Fleet:
Accelerating CVN-21Production Versus Mid-Life Modernization (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005), xiii xvii.
39. Ronald O Rourke, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime
Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for
Congress, CRS-8, March 29, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/mili-
tary/library/report/crs/crs_rl32513.pdf (accessed October 31, 2006).
40. In accordance with the idea of SeaAir Littoral Battle, the J in the CVE
designator reflects the fact that Air Force STOVL JSFs could also operate off
these ships, if that service purchases these aircraft as now planned.
41. Norman Polmar, Submarines Under Attack, Proceedings 131, no. 6
(June 2005): 89.
42. The first four SSGNs were former SSBNs designed to carry and fire the
C-4 version of the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). All
remaining SSBNs carry the larger D5 missile, which would require addi-
tional engineering work to convert. From interviews with officials from
Electric Boat concerning the submarine design base.
43. For example, a ten-boat SSBN force carrying a total of 240 Trident
D5 missiles (24 missiles per boat) with seven reentry vehicles per warhead
(the D-5 can carry up to eight) can carry up 1,680 countable warheads
close to the maximum NPR target of 1,750 submarine warheads. Norman
Polmar, Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 18th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 2005), 68 79.
44. Richard Fisher Jr., Growing Asymmetries in the China-Japan Naval
Balance, International Assessment and Strategy Center, November 22,
2005, http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.83/pub_detail.asp
(accessed November 30, 2005).
45. Ibid.
46. Russian fleet numbers are taken from Globalsecurity.org, Russian
Warships, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ship.htm
(accessed November 15, 2006). U.S. numbers are taken from Naval
Historical Center, Ship Force Levels, 1886 Present, http://www.history.
navy.mil/branches/org9-4c.htm (accessed October 30, 2006).
NOTES TO PAGES 99 105 161
47. For a discussion of how the U.S. Navy is approaching UUVs, see
Robert A. Hamilton, The Brain-Based Controller: A New Concept for
Underwater Vehicles, Seapower 48, no.7 (July 2005): 26 29.
48. Small combatants are defined here as vessels with full load displace-
ments below 3,000 tons. For a discussion about small combatants in the
U.S. Navy, see Robert O. Work, Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat
Ship (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2004).
49. See Globalsecurity.org, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcs.htm (accessed November 15,
2006), and Work, Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship.
50. See, for example, McCarthy Jr., Recapitalizing the Navy s Battle Line.
51. Admiral Mullen, chief of naval operations, unveiled the concept of
global fleet stations at a speech at the Current Strategy Forum, Newport,
R.I., on June 14, 2006.
52. I am indebted to Dr. Eric Labs, Congressional Budget Office, for
explaining the Navy s crewing plans for the LCS.
53. The AEGIS remains the most advanced anti-air warfare system in
existence, land based or naval ; see Polmar, Ships and Aircraft of the U.S.
Fleet, 135.
54. The original target was for $750 million in FY 1998 dollars; see
Global Security, DD-21 Zumwalt, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/systems/ship/dd-21.htm (accessed November 15, 2006).
55. This information was provided by the Navy to Dr. Eric Labs, national
security specialist at the Congressional Budget Office. Dr. Labs conveyed
this information to the author in August 2006.
56. C. H. Goddard (captain, USN) and C. B. Marks (commander, USN), DD(X)
Navigates Uncharted Waters, Proceedings 131, no. 1 (January 2005): 31.
57. Another argument for making the DDG-1000 a technology demon-
strator is that the preferred solution for its integrated power system, the per-
manent magnet motor (PMM), will not be ready for the class. U.S.
submariners are hoping that a PMM will someday power future U.S. sub-
marines. A single AIM DDG-1000 technology demonstrator would allow
the battle fleet to test thoroughly all aspects of a new, all-electric-drive sur-
face combatant as it waits for the maturation of the PMM. A common elec-
tric motor for the aforementioned USW as well as future surface combatants
would result in significant O&M and training savings for the future fleet.
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