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cost benefit calculations, confirming the hypothesis about the high influ-
ence of non-rational factors on a group s decision to pursue innovative
means.
PFLP GC 95
Group dynamics
With regards to the hypothesis that highly structured and highly cohesive
groups led by an undisputed leader are likely to demonstrate a greater capa-
bility to innovate successfully than loosely knit or heavily factionalized
groups that experience strong internal pressures, but will only have the
opportunity to do so under the condition that the decision to trigger the
innovation process is made at the highest level, the  group dynamics vari-
able demonstrates a high level of relevance in this case. At the political level,
the PFLP-GC had a fairly standard political party-like structure, with a
General Secretariat, a Political Bureau and a Central Committee. Jibril
himself was the Secretary General, with Talal Naji as his deputy and Fadl
Shururu as the political bureau secretary.324 Following the interrogations
resulting from Operation Autumn Leaves, it also became apparent that the
group had in the mid-1980 s founded a foreign division, headed by Dalka-
moni.325 Unlike the political wing, this foreign division was a covert one and
thus had a highly compartmentalized structure, consisting of a number of
independently operating international cells that used coded language during
internal communications.326 With regard to the military structure, the
impact of Jibril s military career and his preference for building up a con-
ventional force are clearly apparent. The PFLP-GC forces, which never
amounted to more than 500 fighters,327 were organized into six conventional
battalions attached directly to central military command,328 an artillery unit
armed with katyusha rockets, a naval frogman unit, a mechanized division,
and even an air kamikaze unit comprising small piston engine aircraft, bal-
loons and motorized hang-gliders.329
The most glaring aspect of the PFLP-GC s decision-making dynamics,
however, was the highly ambitious and uncompromising nature of its leader,
as indicated by the remark of Abu Abbas who once complained that Jibril
wanted  all the spotlight to himself. 330 As a result, the PFLP-GC was a very
contentious organization, which had great difficulty getting along with or
even tolerating other Palestinian groups. Further, Jibril s uncompromising
style often resulted into internal opposition. For instance, in 1977 Jibril s
continuing loyalty to the Syrians drove a faction around Abu Abbas to split
and found their own group. Similarly, in the late 1980s Jibril s increasing
links with Iran generated internal opposition within PFLP-GC, when a
faction under Talal Naji started advocating the rapprochement with the
PLO instead. In this case the PFLP-GC remained intact after reaching a
compromise in which collaboration with Tehran would continue, but Naji
could veto political decisions that contradicted his views.331
In sum, the correlation of PFLP-GC decision-making dynamics with the
demonstrated level of innovation is a positive one. First, the strong authority
of Jibril as a leader who was very keen on inventing novel operational
methods combined with the military background of his closest aides to form
a strong driving force behind PFLP-GC s innovative tendencies, confirming
96 PFLP GC
the hypothesis about the greater efficiency of highly structured groups, as
well as the assertion about the decisiveness of the leader s preference in terms
of initiating the innovation process. Second, the contentious nature of the
group and its susceptibility to internal conflicts seems to confirm the
hypothesis that innovation can sometimes be driven by the desire to over-
come factional disputes via rallying the organization behind successful
operations.
Relationship with other organizations
The hypothesis that competition among groups with similar ideologies and
ambitions in the same operational theater would be associated with a higher
level of innovation than in the case of indifference or cooperation among
such groups seems to be confirmed in this case study. In fact, the level of
competition among the different Palestinian factions is probably one of the
best examples of this phenomenon. From the outset of its existence, the
PFLP-GC defined its very identity based not so much on an ideological or a
strategic program, but much more so on the level of criticizing and even
directly fighting other Palestinian groups. Further, the group s small size
and lack of ideological uniqueness led the PFLP-GC to adopt spectacular
military operations as a way of distinguishing itself from other organi-
zations. The PFLP-GC competed operationally not only with Arafat s Fatah
and the Black September, Sabri al Banna s Abu Nidal Organization or
George Habash s PFLP. The fiercest competition was between Jibril and his
former student Abu Abbas of the PLF. The operational competition between
these two groups can be demonstrated in the race that occurred prior to
operation Kibya. Jibril had planned to use air infiltration for quite some
time, but since many of his operational experts who worked on this plan
defected to the PLF, it was Abbas s group that would be responsible for the
first attempt.332 On 21 July 1980 a gas-filled balloon carrying Palestinian
guerrillas with automatic weapons, anti-tank grenades and plastic explosives
was apparently shot down by Christian militiamen as it made its way for the
Israeli border about seven miles west of the Israeli town of Kiryat
Shmona.333 Then on 7 March 1981, the PLF sent two men on hang-gliders
to drop explosive devices on oil refineries in Haifa, but due to unfavorable
weather patterns the hang-gliders crashed before they could reach the Israeli
border. A month later, the PLF would try again, this time using a hot-air
balloon. Even though on this occasion the terrorists succeeded in making
their way over the border, they were eventually shot down and killed by IAF
troops.334 Having studied these failed attacks, Jibril then made the decision
to use motorized hang-gliders, which led to the legendary operation Kibya.
In some cases, the competition between the Palestinian groups got out of
control and even turned into a full-scale war. For instance, prior to 1990 the
PFLP-GC was reportedly directly involved in assassination attempts against
key PLO leaders including Arafat,335 who Jibril branded  a Jew who works
PFLP GC 97
for the Israeli secret service and infiltrated the PLO. 336 Similarly, in 1999
the group s commandos attacked Syrian and Lebanese offices of the DFLP
killing one person and injuring several others.337 The bloodiest was the con-
flict between PFLP-GC and PLF, having escalated to unprecedented propor-
tions on 13 August 1978, when a PFLP-GC car bomb demolished a Beirut
apartment building that served as the headquarters of the military command
and central operations of the PLF. At least 155 people were killed and
80 others wounded,338 making this attack one of the deadliest terrorist
bombings to date.
Besides the contentious and even hateful relationship with many Palestin-
ian factions, the PFLP-GC reportedly also had its collaborative side, mainly
with regard to groups with which it shared a common state sponsor. For [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]